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Abstract 
This paper proposes to test the global hybrid computable general equilibrium model 
IMACLIM-R against macroeconomic data. To do so, it compares the modeled and 
observed responses of the Indian economy to the rise of oil price during the 2003-
2006 period. The objective is twofold: first, to disentangle the various mechanisms 
and policies at play in India’s economy response to rising oil prices and, second, to 
validate our model as a tool capable of reproducing short-run statistical data. With 
default parameterization, the model predicts a significant decrease in the Indian 
growth rate that is not observed. However, this discrepancy is corrected if three 
additional mechanisms identified by the International Monetary Fund are introduced, 
namely the rise in exports of refined oil products, the imbalance of the trade balance 
allowed by large capital inflows, and the incomplete pass-through of the oil price 
increase to Indian customers. This work is a first step toward model validation, and 
 2 
provides interesting insights on the modeling methodology relevant to represent an 
economy’s response to a shock, as well as on how short-term mechanisms – and 
policy action – can smooth the negative impacts of energy price shocks or climate 
policies.  
Running headline: Validation Test for a Global E3 CGE Model. 
Keywords: Global CGE model, Oil shock, Model validation. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the five decades since Johansen’s model of Norway, computable general 
equilibrium models (CGE) have become influential tools for both research and policy 
analysis. In more recent years, the twin challenges of energy security and climate 
change have driven intense modeling efforts, which led in particular to the 
development of hybrid CGE models (e.g., Bataille et al., 2006, Bosetti et al., 2006, 
Edenhofer et al., 2006, Schäfer and Jacoby, 2006). These models aim at providing a 
consistent framework to represent the interactions between macroeconomic 
mechanisms and the energy sector (Hourcade et al., 2006) and became widespread to 
make long-term projections of energy-environment-economy (E3) scenarios. The 
IMACLIM-R model (Sassi et al., 2007), developed in CIRED, counts among these 
hybrid CGE models. It is a global model with 12 regions and 12 sectors, its 
architecture is based on a recursive general equilibrium model with sectoral technico-
economic modules inserted. A detailed description of the model’s architecture is 
given in Crassous et al. (2006a, 2006b). 
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As with any model, a key question is its validation and the determination of its 
validity domain. It appears all the more important as some serious questions have 
been raised about the empirical validity of CGE models (the econometric critique, 
e.g. McKitrick, 1998). In particular they are criticized for relying on one year’s data 
to project decades in the future and for not modeling observations (Barker, 2004 and 
Scrieciu, 2007). The usual explanation for the discrepancy between CGE models 
projections and observations is that these models are designed to explore long-term 
issues (over decades) and do not represent short-term adjustments, whereas economic 
data are largely driven by short-scale processes. We claim, however, that this 
explanation is not satisfying: this article will show that testing a long-term model on 
economic data perturbed by short-term mechanisms is possible and useful in the 
sense that it can improve the credibility of the tools used for quantitative policy 
advice. 
 
In this article, the response of the Indian economy to the rapid oil prices rise of the 
recent years will be investigated. India was chosen for this test because, in our 
model, India is highly vulnerable to oil shocks. For instance, for default 
parameterization of the model, India exhibits a 38% decrease in growth rate for an 
81% increase in international oil price between 2003 and 2005, which is at odds with 
the observed resilience of the Indian economy to rising oil price over this period. 
Investigating why the modeled response of the Indian economy is not consistent with 
current observations will, therefore, be particularly useful to assess our model and 
give insights on the modeling methodology relevant to represent an economy’s 
response to a shock. 
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We analyze the response of the Indian economy over the 2003-2006 period, because, 
over this period, economic data are available and no other large shock affected India. 
Before 2003, the Indian economy is still heavily affected by the consequences of the 
2001 crisis in the U.S. After this period, macroeconomic aggregate estimates are not 
available yet. 
 
In this paper, we have a twofold objective: on the one hand to disentangle the various 
types of mechanisms at play in India’s economy response to rising oil prices and on 
the other hand to validate IMACLIM-R as a tool capable of reproducing short-run 
statistical data. Our methodology is the following. First, we compare the observed 
response of the Indian economy to the increase in oil world price and the response 
modeled with the standard calibration of our model. As shown in Section 2, there are 
very significant differences between the observed and modeled responses. In 
particular, the model predicts a much stronger decline in annual growth than what is 
observed. Second, we explore, in Section 3, whether the assumptions on labor 
productivity growth on which the model lies can be the source of this discrepancy, as 
labor productivity growth is the major growth driver together with population 
growth. We show that they cannot be the only explanation, except with implausibly 
high labor productivity growth. Third, we study in Section 4 alternative explanations 
for this discrepancy, from the February 2006 IMF country report on India 
(Fernandez, 2006): (1) the large capital inflow in India; (2) the incomplete pass-
through of oil world price in the Indian market; (3) the rise of India as an exporter of 
refined products. We then include these mechanisms by changing the 
parameterization of the model and assess the ability of our modified model to 
reproduce the observed response of the Indian economy. In Section 5, we show how 
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taking into account the three short-term mechanisms identified above modifies the 
model results, and allows the model to reproduce fairly well the recently observed 
response of India to rising oil prices. Section 6 concludes and proposes leads for 
future research. 
 
 
2. Modeling macroeconomic response to oil shocks: a first modeling test 
 
Since the first oil shock in 1973, an abundant literature explored the relationship 
between energy prices and growth, on both the empirical side and the theoretical 
side1. On the empirical side, most of the analyses have focused on the U.S. and found 
that oil price shocks have affected output and inflation. In particular, Hamilton 
(1983, 1996) showed in a series of influential works that increases in the price of oil 
were followed by periods of recession in the US. On the theoretical side, 
considerable efforts were devoted to understand the nature and size of the 
interactions between the oil price and macroeconomic aggregates. There appears to 
be no consensus, and competing or complementary theories coexist2. Notably, 
Bernanke (1983) indicates oil price shocks lower value added because firms 
postpone their investments decisions while finding out whether the oil price increase 
is temporary or permanent, whereas Bruno and Sachs (1985) propose the “wage-
price spiral” explanation: to prevent the real wage from falling, a decline in value 
added is necessary in response to an oil shock. Olson (1988) shows a potential 
channel of transmission is the transfer of wealth involved in paying higher oil import 
bills, and Hamilton (1988) suggests the recession is due to a shift in demand causing 
costly reallocation of labor across sectors. Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) argue 
 6 
the decrease in output following oil price increase involves oligopolistic behaviours 
of firms, whereas Finn (2000) imputes this decrease to variable capital utilization of 
firms under perfect competition. Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) focus on the 
recessive effect of monetary tightening in response to the inflation risk.  
 
The previous paragraph highlighted the theoretical complexity of the interactions 
between oil prices and macroeconomic aggregates. Our interest in this paper is 
focused on how large-scale models can draw on this complexity and represent the 
response to an oil price shock, which appears particularly difficult. On the one hand, 
Jones et al. (2004) assert that macro-models (IMF’s MULTIMOD, OECD’s 
INTERLINK, FRB’s FRB/Global) are structurally unable to reproduce the 
magnitude of the economic response to oil price shock, as they resort to single-sector 
production functions and therefore do not capture the intersectoral resource (labor, 
capital, materials) reallocation costs. On the other hand, E3 CGE models represent 
intersectoral interactions but Barker (2004) affirms that they are unsuited to model 
adjustment to price changes such as responses to oil price shocks because they are 
concerned with a set of equilibrium positions and do not represent transitional 
adjustment paths. Their limit, indeed, is to rest on modeling choices (full utilization 
of production factors, maximizing representative agents under perfect foresight, 
flexible production functions) that, most of the time, lead to instantaneous and 
frictionless readjustment to a new optimal growth path after perturbations. As a 
consequence, E3 CGE models represent long-term bifurcations but cannot capture 
short-term mechanisms. 
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IMACLIM-R architecture was developed to try and overcome the two shortcomings 
aforementioned (Crassous et al., 2006a, 2006b and Sassi et al., 2007). It is a hybrid 
model in two senses. (1) It is a hybrid model in the classical sense: its structure is 
designed to combine Bottom-Up information in a Top-Down consistent 
macroeconomic framework. Energy is explicitly represented in both money metric 
values and physical quantities so as to capture the specific role of energy sectors and 
their interaction with the rest of the economy. The existence of explicit physical 
variables allows indeed a rigorous incorporation of sector based information about 
how final demand and technical systems are transformed by economic incentives. (2) 
It is hybrid in the sense of Solow (2000)3, i.e. it tries and bridge the gap between 
long-run and short-run macroeconomics, as efforts were devoted not only to model 
long-term mechanisms but also focus on transition and disequilibrium pathways. We 
seek, indeed, to capture the transition costs with a modeling architecture that allows 
for endogenous disequilibrium generated by the inertia in adapting to new economic 
conditions due to both imperfect foresight and non flexible characteristics of 
equipment vintages available at each period (putty-clay technologies). The inertia 
inhibits an automatic and costless return to steady-state equilibrium after an 
exogenous shock. In the short run the main available flexibility lies in the rate of 
utilization of capacities, which may induce excess or shortage of production factors, 
unemployment and unequal profitability of capital across sectors. 
 
Our model is calibrated on 2001 data from GTAP 5 database (Dimaranan and 
McDougall, 2002). Default parametrization comprise (i) exogenous trends for 
demography (UN World Population Prospects, medium scenario, UN, 2004) and for 
labor productivity growth (this point will be further developed in Section 3 of the 
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article), (ii) resorption of international capital flows on the long term, (iii) 
Armington’s specification (Armington, 1969) for non-energy goods trade and a 
standard market-share equation depending on relative export prices for energy goods 
trade (so as to be able to sum physical quantities and track consistent energy 
balances). 
 
To test our modeling architecture, we perform a first run of the model (simulation 1), 
with default assumptions for all exogenous parameters (in the following, referred to 
as the original version of the model). This model is exactly the one used for long-
term scenarios development, but run over the 2003-2006 period only. In this 
simulation, the oil price is fixed exogenously, to follow the observed oil price 
between 2001 and 2007 (see left panel of Fig. 1). The right panel of this figure shows 
the Indian GDP growth in this simulation. With a rising oil price, the modeled GDP 
growth decrease from 7.6% in 2003 to about 6.3% in 2004 and between 4.8% and 
5.4% in 2005 and 2006, whereas, with constant oil prices (simulation 2), growth 
remains between 9% and 8% over this period. This figure shows clearly that, in the 
model, the Indian economy is highly vulnerable to variations of the international oil 
price. The model reveals an oil price-GDP elasticity equal to -0.048, a median value 
compared to estimates summarized in Jones et al. (2004) ranging from -0.02 to -0.11. 
But this result is at odds with recent observations in India: according to the World 
Bank, the Indian GDP growth lied between 8 and 10% during this period, showing 
the robustness of the Indian economy. The model, therefore, does not reproduce 
observed facts. 
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In the following, we will pursuit a twofold objective: first to try and explain why 
India's resilience to the rise of oil prices is not reproduced by our model; and second, 
to demonstrate whether our model results can approach observations, provided that 
additional mechanisms are included in the analysis. We will show that this exercise 
gives interesting insights on both the various mechanisms and policies at play in an 
economy’s response to a shock and the modeling methodology appropriate to 
represent this response. 
 
 
3. Labor productivity gains as an explanation for India’s resilience to the 
rise of oil prices? 
 
Our model growth engine is composed of exogenous demographic trends and 
technical progress that increases labor productivity, as in Solow’s neoclassical model 
of economic growth (Solow, 1956). Demography simply follows UN scenarios but 
technical progress entails more uncertainty on the short-run. Solow’s model (Solow, 
1957) and following developments on growth accounting make technical change the 
residual of growth unexplained by demography or capital accumulation. Endogenous 
growth theories (see for instance Aghion and Howitt, 1992) explore the mechanisms 
at play behind technical change but the theoretical and empirical researches in this 
field are far too complex to be directly applied in models for long-term projections in 
the climate and energy domain. This is why we use exogenous trends of productivity 
growth, as it is a common practice in the energy-environment modeling community. 
To build these trends we draw on stylized facts from the literature, in particular the 
convergence assumption (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) and two empirical analyses 
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on economic convergence, one investigating the past trends by Maddison (1995), and 
the other one looking at future trends, by Oliveira Martins (2005). For India, default 
assumptions for labor productivity growth lie between 5.7% and 5.3% over the 2003-
2006 period (Fig. 2). 
 
The two sets of assumptions on demography and technical change, although 
exogenous, only prescribe potential growth. Effective growth results endogenously 
from the interaction of these driving forces with short-term constraints: (i) available 
capital flows for investments and (ii) not full utilization of production factors (labor 
and capital) due to the inadequacy between flexible relative prices (including wages) 
and inert capital vintages characteristics.  
 
As a consequence, the difference between our model’s results and observations may 
arise from the growth engine or from the short-term constraints. We first try and 
reproduce the observed growth rate by modifying the growth engine. The 
demographic scenarios we use are adjusted on the short-term to follow actual 
demography statistics. Therefore, the uncertainty on the growth engine, over the 
short-term period we consider, lies mainly in the assumptions on technical change. 
Figure 2 shows the mean labor productivity growth assumptions that are necessary to 
make the model reproduce observed GDP growth (simulation 3). In these 
assumptions, labor productivity growth reaches a peak at 14% in 2005. 
 
These assumptions seem too high to be acceptable, in particular if checked against 
the limited set of data available on labor productivity in India (Bosworth and Collins, 
2007) that give 3.1% and 5.4% labor productivity growth in the industry and services 
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respectively on the period 1993-2004. We may also cite as an upper bound for 
plausible assumptions the labor productivity growth observed during economic take-
off in Europe or Japan in the postwar period or in the Asian “dragons” (e.g. a peak at 
9% in France in 19694, and 8.7% in South Korea in 19835). Furthermore it seems 
unrealistic that the peak in labor productivity growth takes place precisely the year 
when oil price growth is the highest, as labor productivity growth results in fact from 
economic activity dynamics. 
 
As it is difficult to obtain reliable data on sectoral labor productivity growth, it is 
impossible to calibrate our model with real data on this point, but we may consider 
the original assumptions on labor productivity growth as more reasonable. In the 
following, we will therefore look for other mechanisms likely to explain the 
difference between the observed and modeled responses to the oil price rise, without 
resorting to accelerating the model growth engine. 
 
 
4. In search for other mechanisms 
 
The robustness of the Indian economy has been recently analyzed in a section of the 
February 2006 IMF country report on India (Fernandez, 2006). The report identifies 
four key mechanisms that explain the strong Indian growth despite rising oil prices: 
(1) The sectoral reallocation of resources (away from oil-intensive activities) has 
been able to take place smoothly as the economy experiences rapid 
productivity gains; 
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(2) Large foreign currency reserves and strong capital inflows have limited the 
economy's need to adjust; 
(3) The incomplete pass-through of international petroleum prices has 
moderated the income effect on domestic consumers; 
(4) The rise of India as an exporter of refined products has moderated the impact 
of the terms of trade shock and the transfer of income abroad. 
 
The first mechanism, referring to the structural change towards a lower importance 
of oil intensive activities and a greater importance of the service sector, is already 
present in our model. It is taken into account by the internal response of the model, 
which reproduces the sector interactions within the economic system. Figure 3 shows 
sectors contributions to the growth of added value, in the model results and 
according to World Bank data. It reveals that the model represents fairly well the 
sectoral structural change towards a greater importance of the service sector, which 
contributes to around 60% of the growth of total added value in both the model 
results and statistical data. The evolution of the TPES/GDP indicator, reduced by 
3.2% over the 2003-2006 period in the model’s results and by 3.9% according to EIA 
data, also confirms that the model reproduces the aggregate effect of efficiency gains 
and structural change. 
 
The last three mechanisms, on the opposite, are not taken into account by the model. 
First, as it is common practice in our field (e.g. Edmonds et al., 2004, Paltsev et al., 
2005), the default assumption concerning capital flows in the model is that the trade 
balance and capital flows tend to zero over time in all countries, and that price levels 
adjust to maintain these trade and capital balances. This assumption results from the 
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difficulty in predicting capital market and exchange rate dynamics, as country 
attractiveness for investments ensues from many complex factors including political 
stability and corruption risk, and many others. Second, we assume in the original 
version of the model that the tax and subvention structure and the government budget 
structure are not modified in response to the rise in oil price. This assumption is 
made necessary by the high difficulty to predict, and all the more to model, the 
political response to an exogenous shock. These two shortcomings are acceptable in 
a long-term model because these imbalances can exist over the short-term but are not 
sustainable over the long-term: a government cannot increase its deficit or the 
country trade deficit for ever to compensate for increasing oil prices. Third, the 
endogenous formation of prices and export shares in the model does not reproduce 
the magnitude of the rise in Indian refined products exports: modeled export value of 
refined oil products evolves from 2.1 billion dollars in 2003 to 3.1 in 2006, whereas 
statistics show a rise to 6.1 billion dollars in 2006. This is due to the fact that the 
coefficients of the market-share equation representing energy goods trade are 
calibrated on 2001 data when India’s exports of refined products represented a very 
small share of all traded refined products. 
 
Since the model is tested against data that obviously include these mechanisms, these 
additional mechanisms need to be taken into account by the model in this validation 
exercise. In the following, we will exogenously introduce these mechanisms in our 
modeling exercises. 
 
  
5. Further modeling exercises. 
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To see if the model is able to reproduce the observation, the three missing explaining 
factors identified in the previous section have been introduced in the model. It is out 
of the scope of this paper to model the full complexity of these mechanisms. To take 
them into account, therefore, we modified the parameterization of some elements in 
the model so as to approximate the aforementioned mechanisms.  
 
First, to model the effect of the strong capital inflows into India and the large foreign 
currency reserves of this country, we forced the imports of capital into India, from all 
other countries, so that the Indian trade balance6 fits to the statistical data (simulation 
4), whereas in the initial version of the model the country imports of capital remain a 
constant share of all international capital flows (see Figure 4).  
 
Second, to represent the incomplete pass-through of international petroleum prices to 
domestic consumers, we introduced a government subsidy to oil products 
consumption that takes the form of tax reductions (simulation 5). Alternatively, we 
could have chosen to channel the subsidy through cuts in the government-owned 
petroleum company margins, which would have given similar results as more than 
95% of petroleum products consumed are domestically refined. The resulting fiscal 
deficit is financed by a fraction of the foreign capital inflow, which can be seen as an 
increase of the government foreign debt (even if debt mechanisms are not explicitly 
modeled in the current version of the model). According to data from the IMF 
country report, we represent a 40% pass-through, i.e. the fact that domestic oil price 
increased only by 40% of the rise in international oil price.  
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Finally, the rise of India as an exporter of refined products is reproduced by forcing 
exogenously the volume of refined-product exports to follow the data (simulation 6), 
while the original model calculates it endogenously from the interplay between 
supply, demand and relative prices. 
 
Figure 5 shows the results of the initial model (simulation 1) and of several model 
versions, including one7 (simulations 4, 5 and 6), or all of these three additional 
short-term mechanisms (simulation 7). It shows that, while the original model 
simulates a strong decline in GDP growth, the modified model version that includes 
the three additional mechanisms is close to observations. Our results, therefore, 
confirm that the three aforementioned mechanisms are able to explain why the Indian 
GDP growth remained at a high level in the 2003-2006 period despite rising oil 
prices. 
 
Adding the three factors one by one allows one to discriminate their respective 
contribution in narrowing the gap between the model initial results and the data. In 
our model at least, the dominating effect is the disequilibrium of the trade balance 
that is permitted by strong capital inflows. This mechanism alone increases GDP 
growth by more than 2% in 2005. As a comparison, the partial pass-through alone is 
only able to increase growth by less than 1%, and the rise in exports can hardly be 
distinguished from the baseline produced by the original model.  
 
The simulation in which the three mechanisms are included gives growth rates 
relatively close to statistical data. Indeed, for 2005, the year for which the difference 
is the largest, the model gives a 7.9% annual growth rate instead of the observed 
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9.2%. These results show how short-term flexibility, here through changes in trade 
balance and capital flows in particular, can influence in a significant manner short-
term GDP growth, and smooth exogenous shocks. 
 
As an additional test of our modified model version, we compare in Figure 6, the 
evolution of the sectors shares in added value given by the model and observed. 
These results show that the model does not only reproduce aggregate growth, but is 
also able to capture fairly well its sectoral distribution8.  
 
Finally, we show that the model’s results in terms of oil import and refined products 
consumption fit broadly with available data: over the 2003-2006 period, the mean 
annual increase of oil import volumes is 5.3% in simulation 7 results against 7.0% in 
ENERDATA data, and the mean annual increase of refined products consumptions is 
3.0% in modeling results against 3.9% in data. It appears that the model 
underestimate slightly oil imports and refined products consumption, but it might be 
linked to the GDP growth that remains slightly lower in simulation 7 than observed 
growth. 
 
Of course, our results are not perfect and there is still a difference between our model 
results and the observed response of the Indian economy. Section 2 showed that 
changes in productivity growth alone could not explain the resilience of the Indian 
economy. They may, however, explain the small remaining difference between the 
modeled and observed economy. We may now look for the appropriate labor 
productivity growth assumptions (simulation 8) that should be introduced in the 
modified model to bridge the remaining gap between modeled and observed GDP 
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(Fig. 7). They appear to remain in a plausible interval, as they peak at 8%. We may 
note that results from this simulation 8 concerning oil import and consumption are 
now slightly above data: 7.6% mean annual increase of oil import volumes over 
2003-2006 (7.0% in data) and 6.2% mean annual increase of oil products 
consumption (3.9% in data). In terms of oil import and consumption, simulation 7 
and simulation 8 bound data. 
 
We may also suggest that the GDP growth difference between our simulation 7 and 
the observations is partly due to other economic mechanisms that are imperfectly 
reproduced by our model, such as the response of the informal economy, or the 
response of the monetary policy, as explored notably in Blanchard and Gali (2007). 
These mechanisms are important and require additional research to be included in a 
global energy-economy model. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper is a first step toward a validation of our long-term global energy-
environment-economy CGE model against macroeconomic data. In its original 
version, indeed, the model is not able to reproduce the observed Indian GDP growth 
rate, and it overestimates the consequence of a rise in oil price on the economy. 
Taking into account three mechanisms identified in the IMF country report and 
disregarded in the original model modifies significantly the model results, and allows 
the model to reproduce fairly well the observed economic data. In particular, these 
results stress the importance of the modeling of capital flows, which is a weak point 
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in current models. Our results also have policy implications as they highlight two 
mechanisms that smooth the adverse effect of oil shocks over the short term, and on 
which the policy makers have partial control (the subsidy to oil products 
consumption and the capital inflow or trade balance deficit). Moreover, the 
respective effect of both mechanisms is assessed9, indicating that the most powerful 
lever lies in the disequilibrium of the trade balance that is permitted by strong capital 
inflows.  
 
In terms of model validation, this paper remains partial, since it considers only a 
single country, in a single period, and a single type of shock. It is needed, therefore, 
to conduct similar tests for other countries or regions and other periods to further 
assess our model; and with other models to discriminate among the various modeling 
choices that are made in our research community. 
 
From a methodological point of view, our results suggest that the inability of the 
model to reproduce historical data arise from short-term mechanisms that are 
explicitly disregarded. It appears, additionally, that the mechanisms that are needed 
to reproduce the observed Indian response to the rise in oil price are bound to remain 
short-term or local mechanisms. It seems unrealistic, indeed, that the trade balance 
deficits keep growing for decades in all world energy-importing countries. Also, 
government subsidies cannot keep offsetting price increases on the long run. 
Therefore, it appears acceptable not to embark these mechanisms in our modeling 
architecture when analyzing long-term and global evolutions. But these short-term 
mechanisms might, however, play a major role in the transition dynamics, either to 
smooth negative impacts of energy price shocks or carbon tax – like in the Indian 
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case – or to amplify negative impacts if a short-term process acts as an amplifying 
feedback. This is of particular importance for our modeling work. Indeed, following 
the intuition that climate change mitigation costs are mainly transition costs, 
IMACLIM-R architecture was specifically designed to explore transition pathways. 
Important efforts were expended to represent the inertia (e.g., technical and 
infrastructure inertia) responsible for transition costs and to model trajectories year 
by year. But this paper indicates further efforts should be devoted now to explore 
how short-term mechanisms, such as the temporary deficit of the trade balance, may 
play a role in the transition to a low-carbon economy and allow to smooth adverse 
effects of shocks.  
 
Additionally, disregarding short-term mechanisms means assuming a complete 
separation between short-term and long-term dynamics. This assumption is at the 
heart of the growth theory but has been questioned by several authors (e.g., Solow, 
1988; Arrow, 1989). We may thus conclude on another prospect for future research. 
It is necessary to investigate how short-term mechanisms might influence long-term 
growth pathways (see an attempt to do so in Hallegatte et al., 2008) or, in other 
words, if there is a path-dependency of long-run growth. If this influence is non-
negligible, indeed, the analysis of short-run mechanisms will have an undeniable 
place in the understanding of long-run macroeconomy, and modeling teams will have 
to devote more time to the apprehension of the links between short-term dynamics 
and long-term trajectories. 
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Figure 2 
Labor productivity  growth assumptions
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Figure 3 
Sectors contributions to Added Value growth 
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Figure 4 
Trade Balance
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Figure 5 
GDP growth
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Figure 6 
Sectors shares in Added Value in 2003
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Figure 7 
Labor productivity  growth assumptions
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Captions to Illustrations 
 
Figure 1: Left panel: International oil price observed during the 2001-2007 period. 
Right panel: GDP growth computed by the model for simulation 1 with increasing oil 
prices (crosses) or simulation 2 with constant oil prices (triangles) or, and observed 
by the World Bank (points). 
 
Figure 2: Mean labor productivity growth assumptions, for the original model 
(simulation 1) (grey dots) and for the modified (black triangles) growth engine, such 
that the model reproduces observed GDP over the 2003-2006 period (simulation 3). 
 
Figure 3: Sectors contribution to Added Value growth the 2003-2006 period, as 
modeled (results from simulation 1) and in the World Bank data10. 
 
Figure 4: Indian trade balance between 2001 and 2007, as modeled by the original 
version of the model (crosses) and as observed by the World Bank (points). In the 
modified model version, the trade balance is forced to follow the observations 
(simulation 4). 
 
Figure 5: Observed GDP growth in India between 2003 and 2006, and results of the 
initial model version (simulation 1) and of several modified model versions, 
including one (simulations 4, 5 and 6) or all additional short-term mechanisms 
(simulation 7). 
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Figure 6: Sectors shares in Added Value in 2003 and their mean annual growth rate 
over the 2003-2006 period, as modeled (results from simulation 7) and in the World 
Bank data10.  
 
Figure 7: Mean labor productivity growth assumptions to fit GDP data with the 
original version of the model (simulation 3) (black triangles) and with the modified 
version of the model (simulation 8) (grey crosses). 
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1
 See for example Jones and Leiby (1996) and Jones et al. (2004) for a detailed review of the 
literature. 
2
 See for instance Barsky and Kilian (2004) for a review of the various channels through which oil 
prices may operate that were put forward. 
3
 Solow (2000) : ‘I can easily imagine that there is a « true » macrodynamics, valid at every time 
scale. But it is fearfully complicated [...] At the five-to-ten-year time scale, we have to piece things 
together as best we can, and look for a hybrid model that will do the job.’ 
4
 Source: INSEE. www.insee.fr. 
5
 Source: OECD.Stat. http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx. 
6
 Terminology and its link with the model’s representation should be clarified here: the balance of 
payments is the sum of the current account, the capital account and the financial account. The current 
account is composed of the trade balance, the net factor income from abroad (interest and dividends) 
and net unilateral transfers from abroad (such as foreign aid). The capital account is the sum of the 
foreign direct investment, portfolio investment (stocks and bonds) and other investments (for instance 
in currencies). The financial account is composed of transaction involving financial assets and 
liabilities between residents and non-residents. In our modelling architecture, (1) the financial account 
and investments other than foreign direct investment are not represented and (2) the net factor income 
from abroad, the net unilateral transfers from abroad and foreign direct investments are not 
represented separately but grouped into what we may call (abusively) the “capital balance”. Therefore, 
the equilibrium of the balance of payment implies is in our model the equality of the absolute values 
of the trade balance and our “capital balance.” That is why forcing the capital inflow can be directly 
translated into a forcing of the trade balance in our model. 
7
 As we know that these mechanisms are not independent (e.g., the relatively lower oil price due to the 
subsidies is likely to have attracted more capital, influencing the capital inflow), simulations with only 
one mechanism are somehow artificial, but they are helpful to assess the relative importance of each 
of mechanism. 
8
 The additional mechanisms included in the model influence aggregate growth, but do not change in a 
significant manner the sectoral distribution of growth. 
9
 However, we did not explore the welfare consequences of these policies. 
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10
 Part of the differences between modeled and observed sectors share lies in the fact the sectoral 
aggregation used in IMACLIM-R differ from the aggregation used in the World Bank database. For 
instance, food-processing industries are included in the agricultural sector in IMACLIM-R whereas it is 
counted in the industrial sector in the World Bank database. 
